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Narrative ofNeglect: Texa.fil Prisons for Men
BY]. KEITH PRICE AND SUSAN COLEMAN
Prisons, like the prisoners themselves, are often "[b)anished from
everyday sight, they exist in a shadow world that only dimly enters [the
public's] awareness."1 During the 181 years ofthe Texas prison system's
existence, both the people and the policymakers have adhered to such
a maxim. The hallmarks of the Texas correctional policy-the initial
reluctance to establish prisons and chronic lack of oversight, coupled
with the state's well-documented fiscally conservative approach to
social programs-have created decades of neglect, leading to what
even Texas officials themselves have acknowledged as some of the
worst prisons in the nation.2
The policy is a product of the statels political culture, the Puritan
work ethic, the Calvinistic belief in discipline, and a hint of Social
Darwinism. Daniel J. Elazar's classic model identified the political
culture of Texas as individualistic-traditionalistic. Texans generally
view government as "being instituted for strictly utilitarian reasons"
with the effect that "public officials are nonnally not willing to initiate
new programs or open up new areas of government activity on their
own recognizance,") which explains Texas' long reluctance to establish
a prison system and the aversion of poIicymakers to intercede in prison
operations to end the abuse of inmates and corruption of the system.
That reluctance squares with one of Elazar's cultural indicators that
government officials are "willing to [act] only when they perceive an
overwhelming public demand for them to act."4
While neglect by the state has been the dominant paradigm for
Texas prisons, there have been brief spates of refonn-intemally and
externally generated. Outside reformers, such as coalitions of church
groups and related organizations, media investigations, and the courts
through inmate-initiated litigation, have spurred most changes in the
system. Other refonners have included influential, often charismatic,
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Historical Eras of the Texas Prison System
Era Years
Early Beginnings 1829 - 1870
The Convict Lease System 1871 - 1910
Prison Farms ]910 - 1947
The Progressive Era 1948 - 1979
Ruiz Refonn 1979 - 1992
Prison Bureaucracy 1992 - Present
prison administrators. Like the state itself, the prison system has a rich
and textured history.
Spain and then Mexico established the first governmental entities
in Texas, but neither the Spanish nor the Mexican governments
created a penal institution in its Texas colony.s Texas was sparsely
populated because many were unwilling to relocate to the territory
and face the many challenges that were part of tife on the frontier.
However, a nearby pool of available immigrants, the independent and
opportunistic Americans, was willing to dwell in this inhospitable land.
Stephen F. Austin and other empresarios who received land grants to
bring in new settlers screened the newcomers, but many persons of
questionable character entered the Texas territory.6 Law enforcement,
and by extension corrections, was uneven, uncertain, and rough, and
45
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lawlessness was rampant. Punishment was often by means of public
whipping or even by hanging.
The Congress of Coahuila y Tejas passed a resolution in 1829 to
establish the first prison in Texas.? A private contractor was to build and
finance the prison, with lahor provided by territorial convicts. He would
also be required to train and supervise all prisoners whose sentences
included forced labor. If a prisoner worked hard and successfully
completed his sentence, he would be sent to the territorial town of his
choice upon his release. No contractors responded to this economic
opportunity, and the resolution passed into history. The territory of
Texas thus remained without a prison.g
Following a brief revol ution in 1836, Texas became an independent
republic. Under Republic law, county jails housed all prisoners. An
early example of the county jail system was San Augustine County,
where public subscription built the jail. The first Congress appropriated
$15,000 under the "Sheriffs- Fees- Keeping Prisoners Act" to reimburse
the counties for the prisoners' upkeep, but sheriffs felt funding failed
to meet the Republic's responsibility. One sheriff, Henry M. Smith of
Galveston County, billed the Republic $864.63 for his expenditures on
national prisoners. Congress debated legislation in ]84] to establish a
national prison system, but the proposal failed. 9
A second attempt to pass a penitentiary act in 1842 also died,
iterating the pattern of neglect. 10 In December 1845, the Republic of
Texas ceased to exist, and Texas became the twenty-eighth state of the
United States of America.
One of the first topics of business for the new state was to address
the issue of prisons; the First Legislature passed a penitentiary act in
May] 846. Once again, Texas constructed no prison as the outbreak of
the Mexican War the same year delayed implementation. After the war,
the legislature once more tackled the issue of a penitentiary. It passed
legislation declaring that "the new prison wou Id be a place where inmates
would be forced to abide by strict rules of behavior and discipline and
would work so as not to be a burden on the state's taxpayers."11 The Act
authorized the governor to appoint three commissioners who were, in
tum, to select a site for the state's first prison and to hire a superintendent
to manage the institution. The statute provided that the prison should be
located in a healthy climate and be near a navigable body of water for
transportation of convict-made goods to market. The chosen location
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should contain no more than one hundred acres and could cost no more
than fivc dollars an acre. 12
The commissioners selected Huntsville, in Walker County, as
the site for the new prison. The commissioners purchased 4.8 acres of
land at the rate of $22 per acre for the actual site and an additional
tract of heavily-forested land for $470 to support the construction.
·'The reasons for the choice of Huntsville remain a mystery. That the
town was home to Sam Houston and other notable figures in early
Texas [including Commissioner William Palmer] possibly played a
part. Similarly~ local support for the institution, demonstrated by the
gifts of rock and timber, likely also had a favorable influence on the
committee members."13 Community support and continued political
clout contributed to the location of new prisons in close proximity to
Huntsville until the building explosion in the 1990s. The Commission
hired noted Austin architect Abner H. Cook to design the prison, to
supervise the construction crews, and to manage the new penitentiary.
Construction began on August 5, 1848.14
More than one hundred sixty years after the first settlers arrived
and forty years after the first legislation was introduced, policymakers
finally met their obligation to insure public safety by removing the
worst lawbreakers from society and imprisoning them. The Texas
State Penitentiary at Huntsville opened on October 1~ 1849. The first
prisoner was a convicted horse thief. The penitentiary housed three
convicts by the end of 1849, and initially the population grew relatively
slowly (seventy-five by 1855). However, it quickly became obvious
that the public and their elected representatives were no more eager to
financially support the prison than they were to create it initially.ls
The legislature, at the behest of Governor Peter H. Bell in 1853~
had crafted a partial solution-the establishment ofa cotton and woolen
mill within the prison walls. The income would offset the costs of the
prison operations while also providing work for inmates. 16 ·'During the
Civil War the penitentiary sold more than two million yards of cotton
and nearly 300,000 yards of wool to both civilians and the government
of the Confederate States ofAmerica. Wartime production made a profit
of $800,000."17 The prison also supported the Confederacy by housing
Union prisoners ofwar. One ofthese~ the ship's carpenter from a federal
vessel captured at Galveston, built the coffin of the prisoners' frequent
visitor, Sam Houston, who had left his office as governor ofTexas rather
47
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than support secession. IS
The State Penitentiary at Huntsville, commonly known as "The
Walls," was the only prison in the eleven Confederate states that
survived the war intact. '9 Like other prisons of the era, conditions at
The Walls were grim. Conditions were unsanitary, and diseases spread
rapidly. The food was poor and sparse. Discipline was carried out at
the unfettered discretion of the guards and often included whipping
and other forms of corporal punishment. Inmates could be assigned to
the Hdark cell;' a dank, dark, filthy cell without ventilation or light,
opportunities for hygiene, or running water, and only bread and water
as a diet.20 Incarceration at The Walls amounted to "banishment from
civilized society to a dark and evil world completely alien to the free
world."21
By the end of the Civil War, the number of convicts had increased
from 146 to 264, and that number rapidly rose as lawlessness increased
during the chaos of Reconstruction. The former Confederate state was
in dire financial straits and had little money and less inclination to deal
with convicts or their care. The legislature created a five-member Board
of Public Labor in 1866 to administer the penitentiary, which consisted
ofthe governor, secretary ofstate, comptroller, attorney general, and the
state treasurer. The new Board acted immediately to lease one hundred
prisoners to the Airliner Railroad and one hundred fifty prisoners to the
Brazos Branch Railroad as laborers laying railroad track. The convict
lease system had begun.22
The convict lease system presented an attractive solution to the
cash-strapped state in the midst of Reconstruction. Ignored was the
inherent conflict between the contractors who wanted to maximize
their profits and minimize their labor costs and the state that wanted
prisoners to have adequate food, clothing, and shelter. Because of the
mistreatment of prisoners and the administrative difficulties, the first
contracts were abandoned and the inmates returned to the prison.
The governor and legislature abdicated their responsibility for the
prison operations and the welfare of the inmates in 1871 by leasing the
entire prison system to Ward Dewey and Company, a well~regarded
and successful business venture in Galveston. The lease required the
contractor to house, secure, and care for all prisoners under the control
of the company. The lease fee was first set at $5,000, then $10,000,
and finally $20,000 per year. Initially, the contractual arrangements
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appeared successful. However, the company began to have financial
difficulties, and the state was forced to repossess the penitentiary in
1877.:n
The state subsequently negotiated a lease with Ed Cunningham
and L. A. Ellis, landowners from the south and west of Houston,
who utilized convict labor on their large agricultural holdings and
also subleased the inmates to other landowners, small industries, and
railroads. Cunningham and Ellis earned substantial profits from the
leases, which convinced the legislature that prison labor was profitable,
so the state resumed control of the prison system in 1883.24
Convicts also worked on state projects, such as building the
state capitol in Austin. Between 1885 and 1887, approximately five
hundred prisoners quarried granite and limestone or worked on the
construction site. The International Association of Granite Cutters
boycotted the job in protest of the use of convict labor in competition
with free labor, so stone cutters from Scotland arrived to complete the
work. Selected inmates were also trained to cut stone. 25 Prisoners at
the Rusk Penitentiary, constructed to help develop iron-ore deposits
in East Texas, manufactured the building's ornate interior cast-iron
features in its twenty-fIve-ton blast furnace. To transport the stone
from the quarry and the cast iron from the foundry to Austin, the
inmates constructed railroads. They also built the Texas State Railroad
from Rusk to Palestine between 1893 and 1909, and the prison system
owned the line until 1921.26
Convicts assigned to state projects existed in the same dismal,
cruel, and inhumane conditions as those leased to private entities.
Self-mutilation, such as cutting off one's fingers or toes or otherwise
injuring oneself to avoid the lease work, was commonplace~ as was
suicide. Texas inmates were generally not employed on roads, as was
the custom in other southern states but, instead, worked in rural areas
on farms, in mining operations, and in wood camps, essentially isolated
from the public (and media) view. White and Hispanic inmates often
went to the lumber camps, the mines, and the railroads while the state
sent black inmates to farms, where they cut sugarcane, picked cotton,
and worked in the fields. Inmates considered a high risk for escape in the
fields were put into Hthe spur," an iron ankle band with "spurs" pointing
upward that would interfere with an inmate's running, while others
toiled with an iron two and a half pound ball and chain attached. Other
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punishments included hanging by the wrists-from singletrees, from
block and tackles, from windows, from ladders on cotton trailers-with
toes barely touching the ground or in a squatting position for hours,
generally in public areas, such as hallways, so that other inmates could
observe. A similar practice that continued until the 1970s was prisoners
being forced to stand on a barrel or some variation (m ilk cartons, coke
bottles, oil drums) all night with the intent ofcausing severe leg cramps.
[fthe inmate fell or stepped off, the time started againY In a single year,
1876, with a prison population ofapproximately 1700, there were sixty-
two deaths recorded and 382 escapes.2&
Even as the system provided revenue for the struggling state,
tales of the abuse of prisoners filtered out to the general public. An
investigative report by the San Antonio Express revealed a long
history of prisoner abuse, neglect, and hellish living conditions. It
also documented mismanagement and corruption on the part of public
officials. The report and a special session of the legislature ended the
convict lease system in 1910.29
Offsetting the darkness, to a limited degree, of this period ofTexas
corrections was the administration of Superintendent Thomas Goree.
Goree, a lawyer, initiated basic education classes taught by fellow
inmates and gathered a library of several thousand volumes for prisoner
use. For the first time, Texas' prisons employed a classification scheme
when officials mandated that first-time and non-violent offenders, as
well as vulnerable inmates, be segregated from more hardcore and
experienced criminals. Goree also advocated the use of indeterminate
sentencing and the use of "good time", which inmates would earn
by engaging in good behavior, by taking advantage of educational
programs, and, of course, by working. Prison administrators of the time
served at the pleasure of the governor, and Goree was not reappointed
in 1893 by Governor James Hogg because he had not supported Hogg's
candidacy.30
The end of the convict lease system deprived the state of income,
but it had shown prison officials and others that agricultural work was
an ideal fonn of labor for unskilled prisoners.3! The Civil War had
devastated Texas' economy. Many plantation owners sold their lands
due to the end of slavery or, like small landowners, lost property to
bank foreclosures, high taxes, low prices for crops, the depletion of
livestock herds, lack of available and cheap labor, and the inability to
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move their products to market because the means of transportation had
been destroyed. 32 The state, with a ready supply of free labor, saw this
as an opportunity to cheaply amass substantial amounts of land, on
which they essentially continued the plantation system, one staffed by
inmates rather than slaves.
The state acquired the first fanus, the Central Farm and the W.F.
Ramsey I Farm, in 1908 amid discussions that the convict lease system
should be ended.D In two waves, the state purchased the Wynne,
Harlem, Clemens, Imperial, Ramsey, Darrington, Retrieve, Blue Ridge,
Eastham, and Shaw Farms. The prison fanns occupied over 81,000
acres by 1921. The prison had entered the era of state-owned, convict-
worked agricultural programs.34
The prison farm era continued the brutality of the convict lease
period. Whippings persisted as did the use of the "bat;' a twenty-four
inch leather strap, four inches wide with a wooden handle.35 Particularly
popular in the 1920s was the use of the '~pole," a piece of wood beveled
upward with rough edges that the inmate would be forced to straddle for
hours without his feet touching the ground.J6 Against this background,
the 1923 legislation assigning the responsibility for all executions to the
Texas Prison System instead of the counties and mandating the use of
the electric chair instead of hanging went virtually unnoticed. 37
Investigations of the prison system were common; legislative
committees examined the system in 1913,1915, 1923, 1925~ and 1928.
Each reported the same problems ofmismanagement and prisoner abuse
that had been so common during the convict lease system.38 The first real
reform effort followed the visit of a group of legislators and Governor
Daniel Moody to the prison in January 1930. The Governor declared
the prison was "not fit for a dog," and initiated changes beginning with
the appointment of Marshall Lee Simmons as general manager of the
Texas Prison System?) Simmons had served as a member of the Prison
Board and well knew the problems of the troubled system.
Simmons, who had a reputation as a charismatic leader, took
on the task of refonning the system and manufacturing a positive
public image. One of Simmons' creations, The Texas Prison Rodeo,
actually did improve the public perception of the prison. The Rodeo
became known as the "fastest and wildest rodeo in Texas." It included
performances by celebrities and dangerous feats by prison cowboys.
The rodeo drew immense crowds, earning as much as one-half million
51
FALL East Texas Historical Journal 2011
52
dollars a year, before it ended in 1984 because the arena was structurally
unsafe.40 Other public relations tools were a baseball team that played
semi-professional teams from oil companies, choirs that performed
outside the walls, and a radio show broadcast from the prison.
Simmons' other initiatives included a massive cleanup of the prison
and improved Jiving quarters and food~ more respectful treatment of
inmates; improved but still limited educational opportunities; and the
introduction of new industries, such as the Justin Book Company, the
license plate factory, and improved agriculture production. The living
quarters for correctional staff were enhanced, and a sick leave policy
also implemented.41 However, criticism of Simmons for the continued
brutal treatment of prisoners, especially the use of the 44bat,H finally
forced his departure in 1935.42
At the time of Simmons' departure, Texas and the United States
were in the midst of the Great Depression, and Texans were much more
concerned with their own daily welfare than the conditions of the state's
prisoners. Due to economic pressures, the legislature wanted the prison
to become more self-supporting by selling additional agricultural and
prison industry products. However, the Congress of the United States
had passed a law that prohibited the sale of prisoner-made goods to
anyone other than state agencies. 43 Loss of this revenue source made
the future ofTexas' prisons extremely grim, especially given the lack of
strong leadership by the legislature and prison administration. It was as
if the 7~OOO prisoners in Texas were forgotten 50uls.44 As a result of the
inaction, Texas prisons continued to be some of the worst in the United
States.45
Negative assessments of Texas prisons plagued the state. The
Texas State Council of Methodist Women persuaded the legislature
in ]944 to retain Austin MacCormick. the nation~s leading authority
on prison reform, to investigate the system. MacConnick visited each
prison and fann and provided a detailed report of his findings. 46 He
documented three categories ofserious fai lings: I) Inhumane treatment
of prisoners with bad living and working conditions, along with brutal
discipline, leading to mutilations and excessive escape attempts. as
well as inadequate medical and rehabilitation programs; 2) Inefficient
administration and poorly qualified and trained personnel; and 3)
Inefficient production because of antiquated farming methods and few
industries.47 The report drew the attention and ire of many influential
arratil e of eglect: Texa Pri on for Men
indi idual and group, including a ernor Beauford J ter, num rou
I gi lat r ,and am pri n bard m mber. hich r ulted in a new
pri on bard. The n bard harg d the ne eneral Manager,
B. Elli from herb unty. nn , to r form li pri on and
bring mod rn agri ultural practice to the y t m.~ ith thi rna e and
the legi lati n that ab Ii h d orporaJ puni hm nt in pri on , the tate
of Te a finall began to abandon the principle articulated in Ruffin
v. ommomve 11th 1871) that "[the pri n r] i for th time being the
la e of the tat .,,~q
Benchmarks in Texa Pri on Growth
Year Prisoners Year Prisoners
1849 3 1855 75
1860 182 1866 264
1870 489 1878 1,738
1890 3,199 1900 4,109
1912 3,471 1939 7,000
1940 6,070 1945 3,270
1947 3,270 1950 6,424
1953 7,781 1962 11,890
1972 15.709 1978 22.439
1983 36,769 1988 39,664
1990 48,320 1994 91,875
1999 149.930 2006 152,889
urce: Paul M. Lu ko, 'Pri on
On/ine.li, a tate Hi torical
fier rid ar II, a ne ra in Te a pri on arri ed, Jed b Ell i
and u tain db hi immediate u ce ors. IIi faced the daunting ta k
of reforming a t III d epl in debt, hich had er 73,000 acr f
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fann land but purchased food each year, and which had lost the support
of the public and the policymakers. 50 Ellis proposed what came to be
known as the "Ellis Plan." The Plan included initiating rehabilitation
programs, improving living conditions for prisoners, creating a more
scientific prisoner classification system, improving working conditions
for guards, starting a prison industry program, and modernizing farm ing
techniques. 51
Ellis met his goals. Prison infrastructure improved as inmate labor
built new prison industries, such as fences and gun towers to improve
unit security, and kitchens, laundries, and other support facilities to
provide better nutrition, clean clothes for inmates, and more sanitary
living conditions. The prison also constructed new cellblocks, in
addition to donnitories, which provided a safer environment, and
added televisions to the common areas. Ellis also fired many brutal and
corrupt staff employees and at the same time, he tripled salaries for
correctional staff; and benefits such as social security and retirement
plans, became part of the compensation package. The prison also built
housing for staff and provided benefits, such as barber and laundry
services for the newly-mandated standardized uniforms.52 Ellis also
mended strained relationships with the legislature that had frayed when
previous officials had not only denied the truth of the MacCormick's
report but also had continued to be obstructionists.s3 The prison system
changed its name to the Texas Department of Corrections, and Ellis
also received the new title of Director. He did not simply delegate, but
also led the prison system, based on the information he acquired from
his many visits to the various prisons and fanns of the system.54
Dr. George Beto became the Director and Chief of Chaplains
following the sudden death of Ellis on the eve of a Board meeting
in November 1961. Beto, a former Lutheran minister and university
president, had served on the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board, as
well as the Board of the Texas Department of Corrections. Like his
predecessor, he believed in directly managing the prison and frequently
arrived at prisons without warning to visit and observe; a predilection
led to the nickname of "Walking George." During his visits, he often
visited directly and informally with inmates as they went about their
activities. However, his use of force to resolve a work stoppage early
in his tenure left no question as to who was in control of the prison.55
One of Beto's greatest accomplishments was the creation of the
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Windham School District, the first prison-based school system in
the nation. All inmates with only a sixth-grade reading level became
students, and were offered the opportunity to obtain a General
Equivalency Degree (GED) at state expense. Beto also contracted with
colleges and universities to provide classes at the prison and was the
moving force in the development of Sam Houston State University's
criminology program with its emphasis on research in corrections.56 His
concern for prisoners spurred the creation of a diagnostic center, where
incoming inmates underwent extensive medical, mental, educational,
personality, and aptitude testing to help detennine their occupational
abilities and other needs.
Beto clearly understood that the real ity ofmanaging Texas' pri sons
required the balancing of conflicting interests-humane treatment of
prisoners and economic benefit to the state-along with expertise in
media relations and mastery of legislative relations. He increased the
number of prison industries and convinced the legislature to require
state agencies to purchase agricultural and industrial products from the
prisons and to encourage local governments to do so as well. The new
products and services inc1uded fum iture,jan itorial suppl ies, school desks,
bus renovations, and public record data conversions. He also expanded
agricultural operations and continued Ellis' pattern of modernization.57
The ordered, clean, and economically Beto-directed prison system
became a model for the rest ofthe world. However, despite his sterling
reputation among politicians and penologists, critics decried Texas'
prisons as a modem plantation system powered by prisoner slaves, as
well as the continued use of the building tender system that allowed
prisoners to supervise and discipline other prisoners. Furthermore, he
was criticized for his harassment and punishment of inmates filing
lawsuits against the system.58 Understanding that the corrections world
as he knew it was disappearing and adhering to his promise to his wife
to serve only ten years, Beto retired in 1972 with the correct prediction
that ~'[t]hings are going to get worse before they get any better."59
Beto '5 hand-chosen successor was W. J. Estelle. Estelle, a former
warden at California work camps and in Montana, clearly understood
his mandate was to maintain the status quo ofa highly-effective prison
as measured by its low costs, low incidence of reported violence, high
rate of inmate employment, and general cleanliness of the prisons.
However, the surface placidness abruptly ended on July 24, 1974, when
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three gun-wielding inmates seized the Iibrary~ and the longest prison
siege with hostages in national history began. Two of the seventeen
hostages, women teachers for the Windham School District, were killed
as they were used as body shields by the prisoners during their escape
attempt eleven days later.60 ]n addition, criticisms of Estelle's continued
use of building tenders, along with complaints of malfeasance in terms
of government contracts, were becoming louder. Pressures from the
expanding prisoners' rights movement was about to change the Texas
prison system forever, an issue destined to be decided in federal court.
World War II had changed the structure of American society. The
scope ofthe conflict had allowed minorities and women to assume roles
in society previously closed to them. The civil rights movement of the
1960s grew to also encompass the rights ofwomen and captives in total
institutions, such as penal and mental facilities, as part of the broader
social movement.hl Courts had traditionally taken a hands-off approach
to prisoner claims, and had deferred to the expertise of the officials in
management of the prisons. Federal courts especially were wary, given
the nature of the federal system, to intervene in the operations of state
prisons. ]0 the landmark decision of Cooper v. Pate (1964),62 the United
States Supreme Court confirmed that prisoners could sue for protection
of their constitutional rights under The Civil Rights Act of 1871, more
commonly known as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in federal court, and Texas
prisoners and their jailhouse lawyers quickly acted.
The hosti Ie environs ofthe Southern District Court ofTexas that had
jurisdiction over most of the prison system and the Fifth Circuit Court
ofAppeals meant that prisoners were generally unsuccessful. However,
the case of Cruz v. Beto,63 which challenged Beto's barring of attorney
Frances Jalet-Cruz from the prison, heralded the end of the system's
untouchable status. In June 1972, David Ruiz filed a handwritten lawsuit
against the Texas prison system, asking for declaratory and injunctive
relief for violations of prisoners' constitutional rights.64 Although Ruiz
actually filed the lawsuit while incarcerated at the Wynne Unit, the
petition focused on conditions at Eastham Unit, known as the "end of
the road for prisoners~' and for H~the Eastham way' ofdoing things: one
part head knocking, one part line toeing, and two parts hard laboring."65
That Ruiz chose to challenge the conditions at Eastham was significant
as it was one oftwo prison units located in the jurisdiction ofthe Eastern
District of Texas, where Judge William Wayne Justice presided. Justice
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was known to be receptive to controversial and complex litigation. He had
ordered Texas schools to desegregate,66 forced the reorganization of the
Texas Youth Council refonn schools that confined juvenile offenders,67
and required the local junior college to admit students with long hair.68
Concerned about the activity of the jailhouse lawyers, Beta moved
the most active ones to the Wynne Unit, supervised by one ofhis trusted
lieutenants, Warden C. L. McAdams. There, McAdams placed them in
the same cellblock and assigned to a "hoe squad" where they chopped
cotton. The move had unintended consequences. The jailhouse lawyers
combined their talents and produced a series ofcivil rights complaints.69
Ruiz's lawsuit was consolidated in 1974 with seven others and
styled Ruiz v. Estelle for purposes of trial. Together, the petitions
encompassed nearly all of the Texas Department of Corrections
operations, and the suit became the largest prisoner suit in history.7o
That same year, the United States was appointed as amicus curiae and
later intervened as a plaintiff. In addition, the courts approved a motion
that pennitted the action to become a class action. 71
At the time the trial convened, the stakes were high as one ofevery
ten prisoners in the United States was in the Texas prison system.72 The
trial was moved from Tyler to Houston, located in the Southern District,
because of "substantial logistical and security concerns generated by
the prospect of transporting and housing hundreds of inmate witnesses,
most of whom were confined in the Southern District." However,
Justice remained the trial judge.7] According to Justice, following the
years of discovery by the parties, "consumed 161 trial days, [during
which] 349 witnesses have testified, [and] approximately 1530 exhibits
[were] accepted into evidence ... May I express the hope that none
of us are involved in [a trial] of this length again."74 William Bennett
Turner, the nation '8 leading prisoner rights attorney, represented the
inmates. The state fought long and hard to overcome Turner's attacks.
However, some state practices, such as the prisonls use of force and
prisoner building tenders became impossible to defend.75
Justice finally issued his lengthy ruling in 1980. The Ruiz findings
declared that confinement in Texas prisons equated to "cruel and unusual
punishment" that violated the Eighth Amendment ofthe U. S. Constitution
in five categories: overcrowding, security and supervision, health care,
discipline, access to courts, and other conditions of confinement, such as
sanitation, fire and work safety, and hygiene 76
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The ensuing remedial orders and negotiated agreements forced
the state to abandon its former practices and initiate extensive reforms.
One of the requirements was the removal of inmate building tenders,
an order that had an immediate and dramatic effect on the prison
system. The building tenders, or non-paid enforcers, had permitted
the state to employ a minimal numbers of correctional officers, which
saved thousands of dollars each year. However, the building tenders
were difficult to supervise or controL They could not be disciplined
or fired as could an employee, and many of thcse "inmate guards"
became a law unto themselves. 77
The loss of the building tenders created a new problem-a power
void in the cellblocks. Cliques and then prison gangs that had plagued
California, Arizona, and New Mexico exerted ever more control inside
the prisons~ and cellblocks became places where the strong continually
preyed on the weak. The numerical replacement ofbuilding tenders with
correctional officers also took the state years and billions of dollars to
accomplish. The intermediate effect was a rash ofassaults and murders
unlike any that the prison system had experienced in the past. '8
During the trial and the enforcement stages~ the prison system
continued its obfuscatory, intransigent, and obstructive ways. Officials
intentionally misled the appointed Special Master Vincent Nathan, the
governor, the attorney general, members of the Board of Corrections,
Judge Justice, and the public about compliance. Following a July 1987
hearing, Justice issued a contempt order with fines of up to $800,000 a
day. Although never enforced, the threat certainly achieved its goal~ and
the newly-elected governor, Bill Clements, announced to the legislature
that Texas would begin immediate compliance. Through August 1988,
as required in the Civil Rights Act of the losing party, the state paid
the lawyers and firms who represented the plaintiffs $3.9 million, and
another $4.9 million was spent to defray the costs of the master's
office. 79
The effect of the litigation was a restructuring of inmate society,
revision of use-of-force policies, protection of access to courts, and
creation of a modem prisoner health care plan. Estelle resigned in
1983, ending an era of change that began with Ell is in 1948, but the
litigation continued.so "After decades of litigation and reform, reams
of stipulations and decrees were reduced to a brief final judgment in
1992. Many issues were closed out, and others were the subject of only
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global mandates."8J In June 2002, thirty years of litigation in the case
now styled Ruiz v. Johnson were tenninated, followed a few years later
by the death of David Ruiz. 82
The state of Texas began the lengthy process of implementing the
massive changes ordered by the federal lawsuit, changes that would take
decades and cost billions ofdollars. The newly titled Texas Department
of Criminal Justice faced the challenges of evolving public policy.
Southern states, including Texas, had seen huge population growth
with increased levels ofcrime; and politicians met the public's demands
"'to get tough" on crime by imposing longer and harsher sentences,
especially in drug cases. The result was a remarkable transformation
of the Texas prison system.8) In the 1990s alone, prison population
increased 204.1 percent, or by approximately 100,000 inmates, with
a concomitant increase of 124 percent in the number of correctional
officers. The state built seventy new prisons, and, in a departure from
established policy, scattered them across the state rather than in close
proximity to Huntsville.84
In another drastic reversal from the past, communities clamored
for prisons, and politicians eager to be seen as tough on crime and
as providing economic boosts to their constituents were more than
happy to assist. Towns recognized that prisons were, in many ways,
model corporate citizens. They consume few natural resources, are
permanent, unlikely to close their doors or move, and the labor force is
steadily employed. In 1990, the Texas Comptroller ofPublic Accounts
estimated the addition ofa large prison payroll (800 jobs or more) and
its multiplier effect would generate $59 million, while smaller prisons
(260 jobs) would produce a $20.4 million total spending effect.85 By
2000, it was noted that the $91 million budget amounted to $3 million
spread across the state each day with another $3 million per day in
operating expenses.86
The prison system that had once been a minor state agency located
in rural east Texas morphed into a huge government operation, albeit
one without strong leadership as there was a revolving group ofdirectors
during this periodY
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1848 - 1850 Abner H. Cook Superintendam
1850-1858 James Gillaspie Superintendant
1858 - 1859 James H. Murray Superimendam
1859 - 1866 Thomas Carothers Superimendant
1866 - 1867 James Gillaspie Superintendant
1867 - 1869 nladdeus O. Bell Superimendam
1869 - 1869 C. E. Morse Superimendam
1869 - 1870 N. A. M. Dudley Superintendant
1870 - 1877 A. J. Bennett Superintendant
1878 - 1888 Thomas J. Goree Superintendant
1894 - 1899 L. A. Whatley Superintendant
1899- 1902 J. S. Rice Superimendanl
1902-1907 Searcy Baker Superintendant
1907 - 1911 Jacob A. Herring Superintendanl
1911 - 1927 The Texas Prison NACommission
1927 - 1928 H. Walker Sayle Acting General Manager
1928-1929 W. H. Mead General Manager
1929-1930 W. A. Paddock Acting General Manager
1930-1935 M. Lee Simmons General Manager
1935-1935 Dave R. Nelson General Manager
1935 - 1941 O. J. S. Ellingson General Manager
1941-1948 D. W. Stakes General Manager
1948 - 1957 O. B. Ellis General Manager
1957 - 1961 O. B. Ellis Director
1961 - 1962 Jack F. Heard Acting Director
1962-1972 George J. Beto Director
1972-1983 W. J. Estelle Director
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1983 - ]984 Dan V. McKaskle Acting Director
1984 - 1985 Raymond V. DirectorProcunier
1985 -1987 O. L. McCotter Director
]987 - ]989 James A. Lynaugh Institutional Director
1989 - 1994 James A. Collins Institutional Director
1994-1995 D. Wayne Scott Institutional Director
1995 - 2001 Gary Johnson Institutional Director
2001 - 2003 Janie Cockrell Institutional Director
2003 - 2006 Doug Dretke Correctional InstitutionsDivision Director
2006 - 2009 Nathaniel Correctional InstitutionsQuartennan Division Director
2009 - Present Rick Thaler Correctional InstitutionsDivision Director
Source: Texas Prison Museum, "Texas Prison System Leadership'~
(Huntsvi1le, TX: Texas Department of Criminal Justice File
Document, 2008).
The nation's third largest criminal prison system today houses
more than 172,000 prisoners in ninety-six facilities, employs more
than 40,000 (28,500 security staff alone), and the costs more than
$2.8 billion per year.ss The expanded role of the agency includes the
oversight of over 400,000 offenders in community supervision and
80,000 offenders on parole.89
The Texas prison system has undergone a dramatic metamorphosis
over the years. For many years the state neglected its prison facilities
and underfunded their staffs. Today's prison system Iittle resembles the
old as Texas has met the "evolving standards of decency" mandated
by the Constitution and the courts.90 The newer physical facilities are
built in pods, using modern technology of cameras and electronic
controls instead of the telephone-pole cellblock construction although
dormitories remain a mainstay. There are hospital, diagnostic, and
mental health units, as well as units with programs for the aggressively
mentally-ill, for the intellectually impaired? and for both youthful and
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elderly offenders. The system also maintains separate units for inmates
from low to high risk, administrative segregation, and, of course, death
row. The living conditions are clean, and the food is edible and nutritious.
Where brutality once reigned, discipline is administered primarily by
hearings with minimal due process at least, and the penalty is often
a loss of privileges or segregation in a clean, well-ventilated, lighted
cell, where inmates receive the same meals as other prisoners. Use of
force is strictly regulated and monitored. Texas has grudgingly accepted
refonn,91 and continuation of the transformation is insured by multiple
layers of scrutiny, internal and external. Texas' prison operations are no
longer shrouded and hidden from the public.
In spite of such sweeping changes, some things remain constant-
correctional policy is subject to the vicissitudes of politics and the
public's engagement. The prison is authoritarian, and the goal is control.
Work remains a primary part of prisoners' lives. Life is still harsh and
discipline, striCt,92 Seeds of neglect have begun to creep back into the
prison. The Houston Chronicle reported in 2008 that correctional officer
salaries were so low that vacancies numbered over 4,000.93 Prisons
previously dedicated as therapeutic communities and drug treatment
facilities have been converted to traditional prisons.94 The prison has
Jess staff dedicated to treatment and rehabilitation. One of the authors
of this paper, a retired Texas prison warden l issued reduction-in-force
papers to one-third of the teachers and all of the drug counselors at his
unit as one of his last acts before his retirement. Further insight into the
reappearance of neglect of Texas is revealed by examining the fiscal
resources of a similar correctional system. Texas spent $2.8 billion in
2009 on the Department of Criminal Justice while California invested
$9.8 billion for the same period on its Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.95 Texas has made remarkable changes over the years
as its prisons have evolved, but the question is whether the cycle of
neglect will once again become the dominant paradigm.
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